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Abstract  
Objectives  
The Coalition Government’s Public Health Responsibility Deal (RD) was launched in England in 2011 
as a public-private partnership designed to improve public health in the areas of food, alcohol, 
health at work and physical activity. As part of a larger evaluation, we explored informants’ 
experiences and views about the RD’s development, implementation and achievements.  
Methods 
We conducted 44 semi-structured interviews with 50 interviewees, purposively sampled from: RD 
partners (businesses, public bodies and non-governmental organisations); individuals with formal 
roles in implementing the RD; and non-partners and former partners.  Data were analysed 
thematically: NVivo (10) software was employed to manage the data.  
Results 
Key motivations underpinning participation were corporate social responsibility and reputational 
enhancement.  Being a partner  often involved making pledges related to work already underway or 
planned before joining the RD, suggesting limited ‘added value’ from the RD, although some pledge 
achievements  (e.g., food reformulation) were described.  Benefits included access to government,  
while  drawbacks   included resource implications and the risk of an ‘uneven playing field’ between 
partners and non-partners.   
Conclusions 
To  ensure that voluntary agreements like the RD produce gains to public health that would not 
otherwise have occurred,  government needs to:  increase participation and compliance through  
incentives and sanctions, including those affecting organisational reputation; create greater visibility 
of voluntary agreements; and increase scrutiny and   monitoring of partners’ pledge activities.  
 
Key words: Public Health Responsibility Deal; public private partnerships; voluntary agreements;  
public health policy; evaluation research  
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Introduction  
Public-private partnerships (PPPs), which involve co-operative agreements between corporate and 
public sectors [1], are increasingly employed in addressing health challenges [2, 3]. The Public Health 
Responsibility Deal (RD) was launched  by the then Coalition Government of Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats in England in 2011 as a voluntary, pledge-based, public-private partnership 
between government, business, the public sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), to  
improve public health  in the areas of food, alcohol, health at work and physical activity. Andrew 
Lansley, then Secretary of State for Health, asserted that, ‘By working in partnership, public health, 
commercial, and voluntary organisations can agree practical actions to secure more progress, more 
quickly, with less cost than legislation’ [4].  The RD is overseen by a Plenary Group, and consists of 
four networks: Food (F), Alcohol (A), Health at Work (HAW) and Physical Activity (PA). A fifth 
network focusing on Behaviour Change was reconfigured in 2013, and its work incorporated into the 
remaining four networks. Each network has Steering and Working groups consisting of 
representatives of  participating sectors, and has  developed  collective pledges (e.g., ‘We will do 
more to create a positive environment that supports and enables people to increase their 
consumption of fruit and vegetable’)[5] (see  https://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/[5] for full list).  
Partners are required to sign to at least one collective pledge from any of the networks, and to 
produce delivery plans describing how they will implement their pledges as well as annual progress 
reports. DH places these on the RD website [5].   
The public health effectiveness of PPPs, voluntary agreements and industry self-regulation has been 
questioned, particularly when they involve the food and alcohol industries [6-10]. Lessons learned 
from the tobacco arena suggest that voluntary agreements may initially appear helpful, but can 
ultimately serve to stall government action on public health [11].  However, the benefits of PPPs 
have also been elucidated [1]. Bryden et al [12] concluded, based on a review of the evidence,  that 
voluntary agreements can potentially be an ‘effective policy approach for governments to take to 
persuade businesses to take actions’, but only where components such as ambitious, clearly defined 
targets, sanctions for non-compliance, disincentives for non-participation and strong monitoring 
systems are in place.  
This paper reports the findings of a qualitative analysis of  interviews with RD partner organisations, 
those with a formal role in  implementing the RD, and interested non-partners or former partners 
about their experiences and views of  the development, implementation and achievements of the 
RD overall. This analysis  forms part of a wider evaluation of the RD’s processes and likely impact on 
the health of the English population. 
 
Methods 
Conceptually grounded in a logic model designed to describe how the RD might work and should be 
evaluated [13], the research questions driving the analysis in the current paper are: why, and in what 
ways, do organisations engage with, and experience, the RD; how is the RD perceived to be evolving; 
and what are its main achievements, strengths and weaknesses?  
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We purposively sampled interviewees from three groups with experience and/or knowledge of the 
RD: 1) RD partner organisations; 2) DH  officials and others who contributed formally to  
implementing the RD and; 3) representatives of interested non-partners and former RD partner 
organisations. RD partners were selected from a list of 501 partner organisations (February 2013) to 
include those representing the business sector  and other sectors (namely public sector 
organisations, professional bodies, NGOs and charities).  The key criterion used to select partners 
was  the pledges /networks that  they  had signed to, the aim being to recruit not only partners with 
pledge commitments in one network, but also those who had signed to pledges from combinations 
of two or more networks and could therefore provide a broader perspective on the RD.   We 
particularly wanted to have wide representation of business partners since they are key to 
implementing most of the pledges.  To ensure that for each network a range of businesses were 
recruited, the following selection criteria were also employed: type of business (manufacturing, 
retail/service/hospitality, trade organisations); size (smaller and larger businesses); and date of 
joining RD (earlier and later signatories). In order to select specific organisations to approach, we 
generated lists of those signed to pledges from one network, all four networks and combinations of 
two and three networks, and selected businesses fitting the criteria listed above. ‘Other partner’ 
organisations (e.g., NGOs) were chosen on the basis of their expertise in specific network/pledge 
areas or as exemplars of key public sectors. Individuals who had contributed to implementing the RD 
were selected because of their familiarity with networks and pledges. Non-partners were selected to 
be similar to partner organisations. ‘Former partners’ were those who had signed to the RD but 
subsequently left.  Organisations were contacted by email, sent the study information and consent 
sheets, and invited to participate. Where an organisation did not wish to participate, another 
organisation with similar characteristics was approached.  
We conducted 44 semi-structured interviews with 50 interviewees (sometimes conducting a joint 
interview with more than one representative of an organisation on request), by which point data 
saturation had been reached.  Thirty-eight interviews were conducted face-to-face and the 
remainder by telephone.   Representatives of 32 partner organisations were interviewed: 25 
interviews were conducted with representatives of businesses, including a range of manufacturers/ 
producers, retailers (supermarkets and others), companies representing the ‘hospitality’ industry, 
service-related businesses, and trade bodies.  Seven were conducted with  those representing 
organisations  from other sectors (public sector, professional bodies, NGOs and charities (hereafter 
referred to as ‘other’ partners)). Nine interviews were undertaken  with  DH  officials and other 
individuals who  contributed to   implementing the RD (‘RD implementers’); and three with 
representatives of non-partner or  former RD partner organisations (‘non-partners’). The types and 
numbers of organisations and individuals that participated, as well as the self-reported job titles or 
roles of the participating interviewees, are presented in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.  Nine RD 
partners had signed to pledges from one network only, ten to pledges from two networks, nine to 
pledges from three networks, and four to pledges from all four networks. Eleven partner 
organisations that were approached declined to participate or failed to respond, as did four non-
partners, and one ‘RD  implementer’.   
[Table 1] 
 
[Table 2] 
The interview schedule covered a wide range of issues, but those relevant to the current paper 
were:  the RD’s perceived aims and objectives, pledges and networks; motivations for participating 
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or not; and, with partners, experiences of choosing, implementing and reporting on pledges, and of 
being an RD partner; perceived strengths and weaknesses of the RD; achievements to date; and 
views / expectations about the future.  Participant informed consent was obtained before 
interviews. As part of the consent process, interviewees were assured that neither they nor their 
organisations would be identified in any reports of the study findings. Ten interviewees did not want 
to be quoted, but agreed that their data might otherwise be used.  Reasons for not wanting to be 
quoted included those related to commercial competition, personal and professional reputation, 
political sensitivities and concerns about being personally identifiable through opinions expressed. 
The interviews were conducted between June 2013 and August 2014 by MAD and LG, alone or as a 
pair, and audio-taped. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and two and a quarter hours.  
Interviews were transcribed verbatim and checked for accuracy of transcription. A thematic analysis 
was undertaken. As preliminary analysis was undertaken in parallel with fieldwork, themes emerging 
in earlier interviews were explored in later ones.   Data were coded in NVivo (version 10) [14], using 
the frame of the interview schedule: 25% of transcripts were checked by a second team member to 
ensure coding consistency.  Themes and sub-themes were progressively refined, and discussed at 
team meetings.   We analysed the data for agreement and divergence within and between groups of 
interviewees. Key principles of reflexivity in qualitative research [15], including researcher 
triangulation, were adhered to.  
 
Findings  
Key themes and sub-themes presented here are outlined in Table 3. 
[Table 3] 
1. Perspectives on the launch of the RD 
1A. Contextualising the RD’s launch 
RD partners linked the reason for launching the RD to the prevalence of obesity, alcohol and other 
public health problems and their  cost to a stretched National Health Service (NHS), and the need for 
the Government to take, or be seen to take, action. Some interviewees ascribed the choice of a 
voluntary partnership approach to the Government’s perceived non-interventionist ideology.   
 
…..it was an alternative basically to regulating the producers of junk food, right to say, well, 
actually we’re going to have this Responsibility Deal where rather than regulating people 
everybody comes together and we all, you know, work happily together to achieve these 
common objectives.  ……….in some ways it’s about the Government being able to 
demonstrate that the, you know, the commercial sector is playing ball, you know.  Rather 
than about, you know, bringing together a genuine, coordinated, strategic intervention for 
public health…  (other partner 02) 
 
1B. Justifying a voluntary approach 
 
Business partners and ‘RD  implementers’ invoked precedents involving industry self-regulation and 
collaboration (e.g., with the Foods Standards Agency (FSA) to reduce use of salt in the diet) to 
 7 
 
support the use of a voluntary approach, along with the argument that imposing a legislative 
approach would run contrary to business interests, whilst proving time-consuming to introduce, 
costly and irrelevant in  some pledge areas.  Regulation, it was claimed, could lead to unintended 
consequences, such as businesses only meeting minimum requirements, while pledge-linked 
voluntarism would encourage greater engagement and commitment to making changes. It was 
argued that making businesses responsible through public pledges would facilitate greater progress, 
for example, by stimulating competition between them, thereby driving pledge-related change and 
innovation.   
 
2. Becoming an RD partner: motivations and deterrents 
2A. Motivations: reputational enhancement, staving off regulation and having a voice 
Business partners’ reported motivations for joining the RD included those related to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), beliefs about it being the right thing to do, their business having a health-related 
focus or ethos, or because they were already working in pledge areas. The key motivation 
underpinning many businesses’ joining narratives, though, was reputation: the explicit or implicit 
expectation among signatories was of opportunities for reputational enhancement, for example, 
through working with, or supporting, government, or conversely reputational damage through not 
joining. Other, less frequently reported motivations included customer expectations, the desire to 
stave off regulation or legislation, and, for smaller companies, anticipated business opportunities 
through networking.   
 
….we don’t want to work responsibly just because of legislation, it’s ‘cause we believe that 
for our customers and society it’s the right thing to do.  But if we don’t act that way, then, 
you know, legislation will come and that might have more of an effect on us.  (business 
partner 05) 
 
Other (that is, non-business) partners’ motivations included wanting to support or provide expertise 
to government, having a voice in shaping the RD, social responsibility, or because they were already 
undertaking pledge-related work.  ‘RD implementers’’ views of partner motivations echoed those 
expressed by partners themselves.     
 
2B. Deterrents: costs, reputational damage and ideology 
Both business and other partners described anticipated resource implications as a deterrent to 
participation. ‘RD implementers’ and non-partners suggested that businesses might also be 
concerned about NGO or public scrutiny or about being seen as aligned with government, while 
NGOs might not join for ideological reasons (e.g., believing that voluntary schemes had no impact or 
that industry should not be involved in health policy).     
 
…..we have a viewpoint that big business shouldn’t be involved in public health policy (non- 
partner 03). 
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…..companies wouldn’t sign up because there was going to be so much paperwork……And 
some people might think they don’t want to be linked to the Government…. (‘RD 
implementer’ 04) 
 
3. Being an RD partner: choosing achieving against, and reporting on, pledges 
3A. Rationale for collective pledge choices    
Two key, inter-related themes emerged in accounts of partners’ pledge choices: ‘doing it already’; 
and ‘playing it safe.’   
Partners frequently reported signing pledges which were relevant to their business, or activities in 
which they were already engaged, or planning, before joining the RD, and which therefore did not 
require substantive changes to business plans.  ‘Playing it safe’ also appeared to be a common 
modus operandum. Partners described wanting to be sure that they could feasibly deliver against 
pledges:  the necessary resources, strategic flexibility and technical capacity had to be in place. 
Reported constraints also included factors related to business suppliers or customers. A number 
suggested that relevance and capacity to deliver were also important determinants of future pledge 
choices.    
 
 
Well two of them were no-brainers.  The calorie labelling and the trans fat, we were already 
doing it, so why not sign to it?  (business partner 06) 
I believe they wanted people to, kind of, pledge other things, and that kind of thing, but I 
think you end up with such a long list of pledges, and 99% of them will be what people are 
doing anyway. (business partner 05) 
 
 
3B. Achievements   
Partners described achievements against pledges related, for example, to reformulation (alcohol 
units, calorie and salt reduction), labelling activities and the introduction of physical activity or 
health at work interventions, though some reformulation work in particular (e.g.,  on salt) was 
acknowledged to have started before the RD.  Business partners also reported some ‘quick wins’; for 
example, meeting salt targets by replacing products purchased from suppliers with lower salt 
versions.     
 
 3C. ‘Additionality’  
Perhaps not surprisingly given the rationale for their pledge choices, a substantial number of 
partners (both business and others), when asked about their activities, reported not doing anything 
particularly new or different to their usual practice as a result of the RD.   
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Healthier staff restaurants, again, you know, our staff want to eat healthily too.  So again, 
that’s something we were moving towards anyway, introducing more, kind of, salads and 
healthier options and alternatives and more vegetables, and that kind of thing.  So, I 
wouldn’t like to sit here and say that the Responsibility Deal has led us to where we are, but 
it may well have done for others.(business partner 08) 
 
For others (again both business and other partners),  although some of their pledge-related activities 
had already been underway, RD partnership  led them to sign a pledge(s) related to issues which 
they might not previously have considered or to bring forward activities which they would likely 
have undertaken eventually.   For example, one partner reflecting on its HAW pledges noted: 
 
I think things like reporting of [employee] absence in the [organisation’s] annual report stuff 
is directly linked to the Responsibility Deal ( other partner 07) 
 
RD partnership was also said to result in the acceleration of existing activities to meet reporting time 
frames; to provide a framework against which to better structure activities; the development of a 
stronger focus on monitoring and reporting activities in pledge-related areas; and an increased 
awareness of partners’ potential to facilitate healthier choices and behaviours among  employees or 
consumers. 
 
 3D. Monitoring and reporting on pledge-related activity 
While many partners reported having some pledge-related activity monitoring data, though not 
necessarily collected solely for RD purposes (e.g.,  numbers of employees taking part in company 
health at work or physical activity pledge-related initiatives  etc),  a number acknowledged their lack 
of robust data collection systems. Furthermore, demonstrating whether or not pledge 
implementation had influenced the target population (e.g., customers) was said by some to be 
unmeasurable.  
 
Calorie reduction is my biggest issue as a pledge, because I can physically offer customers a 
choice through labelling, through product format, through advice, through menu planners of 
ways to help them reduce their calories, but I don’t control what they eat.  So at the end of 
the day, I can’t measure if customers have actually reduced their intake……  (business partner 
14) 
…I think it’s quite difficult to define, you know, particularly say the sort of physical activity 
pledges in terms of how you actually quantify that success. (business partner 16)  
 
Partners indicated that RD annual reporting was useful for internal purposes (e.g., CSR reports), 
maintaining focus, and providing opportunities for showcasing activities or comparing themselves to 
competitors. However, some described the reporting process as resource-intensive and a handful 
were concerned about potential negative publicity, the perceived quality of reporting by others, or 
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questioned whether and how DH used the reports. Interviewees from all groups, including non-
partners, reported that DH should hold to account those who failed to deliver on and/or report 
against their pledges, although the idea of formal sanctions was rejected by  a significant number of 
business partners, a couple of other partners and some ‘implementers’, for example, on the grounds 
that the RD was voluntary.   
 
4. Benefits and drawbacks of being an RD partner 
4A. Benefits  
For those business partners who reported benefits, these included: access to government, 
information and data; positive publicity (e.g., presenting at an RD event); and/or recognition from 
government. A few mentioned potential financial gains associated with reformulation activities or 
new contracts. Partnership constituted a ‘currency’ when networking or tendering for business, 
implying shared values or a commitment to social responsibility.  
 
……we often get asked when we’re pitching to be the supplier of somebody, “Well………how 
do you work, what are your values?  What’s your social responsibility, your view on that? ” 
And, actually, you’re able to say, “Well, actually, it’s, you know, we’re part of the 
Responsibility Deal, we’re part of, you know, we’ve got pledges in there,”…(business partner 
05). 
 
 
 Partners from other sectors also reported as benefits access to government and networking 
opportunities. 
  
It’s good for us in terms of our relationship with DH that we’re involved and it’s good to, you 
know, it has been good in terms of a networking opportunity… (other partner 02)  
 
 
4B. Drawbacks: lack of ‘level playing fields’   
Contrasting with business partners’ support for a voluntary partnership approach was the concern of 
some about what might be termed the lack of ‘a level playing field’. They described this, firstly, in 
terms of the small percentage of participating businesses /organisations in a sector ‘carrying’ a larger 
number of non-participants. The relative absence of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) was 
noted, and attributed partly to the RD’s perceived lack of visibility and DH’s presumed focus on 
bigger firms able to influence more of the population.  Some ‘RD implementers’ acknowledged that 
SMEs were difficult to recruit, possibly because of the perceived resource implications of 
participating.  Secondly, a number were concerned about possibly being put at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to non-participants, who were not, for example, reformulating products, or 
compared to larger partners, who were viewed as having greater capacity for implementing pledges, 
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and more influence with government. A number also alluded to perceived variability in how some of 
their fellow partners interpreted, implemented or reported on pledges.  
 
…..perhaps some of the other outlets that are on the high street wouldn’t be meeting the salt 
targets in the same way and you’re getting quite a difference in playing field and the more 
that – the bigger the difference, the harder it gets. (business partner 19) 
 
And I think, looking back and reading through some other deliverables that other..… 
organisations had done, they were…….. ascertaining credit for something, you know, 
activities that they’d already done.  Whereas I felt that, with [company name], they were, 
sort of, looking forward with theirs. (business partner  21) 
 
4C. Challenges: Resources, government expectations, lack of recognition  
As well as the costs involved in annual reporting, partners identified as challenges a perceived lack of 
DH/government understanding of how business works and the perceived expectation that they 
could commit to ever more pledges. A number of business partners reported feeling inadequately 
rewarded or supported for putting their ‘head above the parapet ‘(Business partner 13)). Pledges 
such as those involving reformulation were said to be both technically and financially challenging.  A 
few noted that customer sensitivity is crucial, as customers can choose other brands. Equating the 
demands of pledges with business growth could therefore be challenging.  However, potential 
longer term gains were perceived to exist if pledge delivery could be linked to employee/ consumer 
health or to customer preferences.  
 
….consumers recognise even the smallest changes and, you know, that’s a huge business risk 
for us to do that. (business partner 18) 
 
 
 
5. Successes and achievements of the RD as a mechanism for delivering public health 
goals 
5A. Defining success: processes and achievements 
A number of ‘RD implementers’  considered the establishment of the networks and the fact that 
hundreds of businesses had signed pledges to be markers of the RD’s success.   
Interviewees from all groups, including non-partners, named specific food and alcohol pledges which 
they felt were successful or showing promise, with the salt pledges in particular being said to have 
already had a measurable impact on population health. However, some included the caveat that the 
salt pledges’ success should be attributed to the FSA, with the RD simply re-framing activity which 
had originated before it: 
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Well, I just don’t think the Responsibility Deal has achieved very much at all that wasn’t 
being done before the Responsibility Deal was set up, to be honest. (other partner 03)  
 
Business partners and ‘RD implementers’ perceived a raised awareness by organisations and their 
employees of the importance of  health  in the work place  to be an important achievement.  
 
I think what they’ve done in their workplaces as part of the holistic approach to occupational 
health and wellbeing in the workplace, that’s what I hear them get most excited about, 
‘cause they can very directly see an outcome. (business partner 22) 
 
However, a couple of interviewees were concerned about potential negative impacts of the RD:  
At the edges, I mean, it might actually exacerbate inequalities in health, I suppose, as many 
measures do have a beneficial impact on better off people or people who are more able to be 
in charge of their own decisions and,   about lifestyle issues and that’s – and tends to be, you 
know, people who are better off. (non-partner 01)  
 
  
6. Improving the RD in a time of uncertainty    
6A. Political uncertainty 
Participants from each of the interviewed groups reported being uncertain about the RD’s future, 
believing it to be to be politically-dependent and likely to be affected by the results of 2015 United 
Kingdom General Election. However, there was disagreement about whether a change of 
government would result in the RD’s termination. 
  
6B. Vision and visibility   
Some partners also expressed uncertainty about the Government’s vision or strategy for the RD, 
and/or called for the DH/ or Government to define and communicate clearer objectives and 
prescribed outcomes and to provide the RD with more leadership, visible support and commitment.  
 
…so I think politicians have to be – to own it and not be afraid to promote it and to set out 
the political vision that underpins it, or overarches it, probably, to put it a better way 
(business partner 22) 
 
 
Related to this, some argued that the RD lacked a sufficient  profile, and was largely invisible not 
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only to the public, but also within parts of the business sector. While concerns were expressed that 
greater public visibility could be potentially be double-edged for partners vis-à-vis reputation 
management (positive recognition versus criticism), some interviewees suggested that a higher RD 
profile was required, for example, to encourage greater participation and to promote achievements.  
 
I think its key non-achievement is not being well promoted and well understood, except for 
pockets of organisations where this is happening.  So I do think it needs better promoting. 
(business partner 08) 
 
 
 
 6C. Strengthening the RD   
While some   pledges were singled out as successful, a number of interviewees  suggested that 
others   might be improved, for example, in terms of their evidence bases, their perceived clarity of 
objectives, the prescriptiveness or not of their targets, and their associated reporting requirements 
(although others viewed greater prescription as a deterrent to pledge signing).  
A number of interviewees, including business partners, expressed a wish to see the RD grow ‘more 
teeth’ (business partner 01); for example, in terms of defining its objectives, targets and outcomes; 
incentivising and holding to account  partners; or incentivising non-participants to join. Finally, some 
interviewees acknowledged the importance to RD credibility of stronger monitoring and scrutiny or 
independent evaluation of pledge activity and its potential impact.  
 
Discussion 
Our findings suggest that the impact of PPPs like the RD as public health initiatives may be limited if 
they continue to be developed and implemented as the RD has been to date.         
Business partners’ reported motivations for participating in the RD include enhancing CSR and 
reputation,  ‘doing the right thing’, and the wish to stave off  regulation, while reputational 
management also appears to be a key consideration in terms of partners’ pledge choices, 
implementation and reporting activities. This echoes previous findings [12,16], and supports 
suggestions [6,11] that industry participation in self-regulatory or voluntary agreements may be less 
about improving public health and more about image and reputational enhancement, and  about 
seeking to influence the regulatory environment. There is, arguably, potential for government to 
employ reputational levers to encourage participation and compliance in PPPs like the RD, 
particularly if this is done in conjunction with efforts to raise the profile and visibility of such 
initiatives among the public. However, such levers alone are unlikely to lead to significant public 
health outcomes: indeed the existing evidence suggests that the more effective voluntary 
agreements and partnerships include formal sanctions for non-compliance and disincentives for non-
participation [12, 17], and a clear understanding by partners of the nature of such sanctions [18].  If 
the government is to continue to use the RD-like voluntary agreements as a key strategy for 
encouraging corporate (and indeed other sector) action on public health, it should consider building 
in formal, explicit sanctions and incentives, in line with the evidence.  
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More positively, PPPs have been shown to create some opportunities and benefits in the health 
arena [1].  It would appear that the RD has encouraged  a number of partners to work in a pledge-
related area previously not considered, or to act sooner than they might otherwise have done  even 
if they might have undertaken the action eventually ,  or has raised  awareness of  health issues 
among  business partners. However, partners generally reported signing pledges related to activities 
which they were already undertaking or had planned before joining the RD, or committed to ‘safe’,  
easily deliverable pledges. Where achievements or successes were described, these were sometimes  
related to activities, such as alcohol labelling, trans-fat removal or reformulation of products, that 
had started before partners had signed the relevant pledges. This is in line with Panjwani and 
Caraher’s [19] contention that ‘old gains’ are being employed as success indicators.  The RD, and 
similar initiatives, will only contribute to public health beyond what would otherwise have been 
possible, if partners, on an individual basis, undertake actions which go beyond ‘business as usual’, 
and which they would not otherwise have  undertaken (so called ‘additionality’ [20]). In general, 
therefore, it is likely that any ‘additionality’ generated directly from RD partnership or its pledges is 
limited in scale, a finding emerging also in other components of  our  wider evaluation of the RD 
where delivery plans and annual reports of activity have been analysed [21-24]. Furthermore, in the 
current study, the fact that networks are operational and partners are committing to pledges was 
cited as evidence of RD success. It has been argued that the RD’s success should be measured in 
terms of whether pledge targets (e.g. calorie reduction targets) are met, or in terms of outcomes at 
the population level [19, 25], rather than processes. At present, however, many of the RD collective 
pledges lack clear, measurable targets and/or clearly defined outcomes, meaning that any impacts 
or outcomes are not readily amenable to direct evaluation [13], and are  most appropriately 
assessed by reference to the wider evidence of “likely” impact, as we have done in other elements of 
our evaluation [21-24]. Exploring issues of process and implementation with informants, as in the 
current analysis, is also key to judging likely RD additionality and / or impact.     
While supporting a voluntary approach, some business partners were concerned about the 
development of ‘uneven playing fields’ between themselves and non-partners, whom they believed 
to be free-riding without any sanction from government, or between partners, for example, as a 
result of the greater capacity of some to implement pledges or perceived variability in the 
interpretation, implementation or reporting of pledges between partners.  The challenge of 
potentially ‘uneven playing fields’ has also been raised elsewhere in relation to PPPs [16]. 
Furthermore, while benefits in the form of business opportunities and recognition were said to have 
been experienced, disappointments were aired about praise not always being given where it was felt 
to be due.  Such arguments would appear to run contrary to  expressed support for voluntarism, but 
also suggest a level of dissatisfaction with the RD, even amongst those who might have been 
expected to have had a vested interest in its survival. This may, of course, be some partners’ way of 
signalling to government that they needed greater incentives for participation. However, the view 
that the RD required strengthening and ‘more teeth’ in terms of a clearer strategy and defined 
future,  a higher  profile, more visible support from government, and more independent scrutiny and 
evaluation, as well as improvements in pledges, and a holding to account of non-compliers, was also 
voiced by interviewees. These features have all been associated with effective partnerships and 
voluntary agreements [12, 17, 18, 26] and should be implemented, if the Government wishes to 
strengthen or replace the RD.   
The strengths of this analysis are that we were able to interview a wide range of partner 
organisations and others.  A key challenge in conducting an evaluation of a mechanism like the RD is 
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to get beyond the  public accounts of the different interests represented among interviewees.  Given 
the number of interviewees who did not wish to be quoted, but agreed to be interviewed, and some 
lines of argument running contrary to what might have been expected in public accounts (e.g., 
partners reporting that they were choosing pledges that reflected what they were doing in any case 
before joining the RD), we believe that our findings go beyond straightforward public accounts, thus 
providing a reasonably nuanced set of perspectives on the RD.  The fact that a significant number of 
interviewees did not wish to be quoted is interesting in its own right and indicative of the personal, 
professional, sectoral and political sensitivities surrounding the RD as a policy mechanism. The main 
limitation of the study is that we were unable to interview many non-partners.   Given the perceived 
lack of visibility of the RD, it is quite likely, however, that unless they had had a particular interest, 
non-partners might have contributed relatively little  additional  insight.  
 
Conclusions 
If  the objectives of the RD or similar future initiatives are to be realised, this analysis  suggests that 
there is a need for greater consideration of how potential reputational gains and losses, along with 
more formal incentives and sanctions, can be used to encourage participation and the 
implementation of pledges that go beyond ‘business as usual’. Furthermore,  greater consideration 
needs to be given to how RD-like PPPs might be strengthened in terms of pledge construction and 
reporting, visibility, and independent monitoring and scrutiny  of pledge activities.   
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Table 1: Evaluation Participant Organisation types 
 
                                                                                                                                                    Number   
 
RD Partners  
A) Business partners (business partners 1-25) 
Manufacturing/producers (food, alcohol, health and wellbeing products)                   10      
Retailers (supermarkets and other retailers) / service sector                                             6                                                                         
Hospitality industrya                                                                                                                    6 
Trade organisations                                                                                                                     3 
 
 
 
B) ‘Other partners’ (other partners 1-7) 
Public sector                                                                                                                                2 
Charities/ NGOs / professional bodies                                                                                    5 
 
 
Non / former partners  (non-partners 1-3)                                                                                                         
Charities                                                                                                                                       2 
Otherb                                                                                                                                           1 
 
Individuals with roles in running the RD (‘RD implementers’ 1-9)b      9                                               
 
 
 
(aIncludes catering, restaurants, pubs; bproviding more information might lead to deductive 
disclosure of participants’ personal identification).  
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Table 2: Interviewees’ self-reported roles or job titles in their organisations 
 
Reported role or job title                                                                                     Number 
 
 
Company / organisation Director                                                                                5 
Human Resources Director/ Manager                                                                        3 
Marketing Director/Manager                                                                                       4 
Communications Director/ Manager                                                                          2 
Chief Executive Officer or similar                                                                                 5 
Company Nutritionist                                                                                                     4 
Public Affairs / CSR Director or Manager                                                                    6 
Manager/staff with responsibility  for employee health / wellbeing                    4  
Business / organisation Policy Officer or Manager                                                   2 
Compliance / risk/ technical Manager                                                                        4 
Miscellaneousa                                                                                                              11 
 
Total                                                                                                                                 50 
 
 
 
(aIncludes DH officials  and others who might be  personally identifiable by their roles /titles)  
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Table 3:  Findings - key themes and sub-themes  
Theme 1: Perspectives 
on the launch of the 
RD 
 
1A Contextualising the 
RD’s launch  
- Prevalence of 
public health 
problems 
- Need for 
government to 
be seen to act  
- Perceived 
governmental 
non-
interventionist 
ideology  
 
1B Justifying a voluntary 
approach  
- Invoking 
precedents 
- Legislation is 
contrary to 
business 
interests 
- Voluntarism 
encourages 
commitment 
and progress 
 
Theme 2: Becoming 
an RD partner 
 
 
2A Motivations  
- Corporate social 
responsibility / 
‘doing the right 
thing’ 
- Reputational 
enhancement 
opportunities 
- Staving off 
regulation  
- Having a 
’voice’/ 
providing 
expertise 
 
2B Deterrents  
- Resource 
implications 
- Potential for 
scrutiny 
- Ideological 
objections 
Theme 3: Being an RD 
partner 
 
 
3A Rationale for pledge 
choices  
- ‘Doing it 
already’ 
- ‘Playing it safe’ 
 
3B Achievements 
- pledge 
successes  
- ‘quick wins’ 
 
3C ‘Additionality’  
- going beyond 
‘usual practice’? 
 
 
3D Monitoring, and 
reporting on activity 
- data gathering 
- benefits 
- drawbacks 
- accountability 
Theme 4:  Benefits and 
drawbacks to being an RD 
partner 
 
4A Benefits 
- Information and 
access 
- Recognition and 
publicity 
- RD as a ‘currency’ 
 
4B Drawbacks 
- Uneven ‘playing 
fields’  
 
4C Challenges  
- Resources 
- Government 
expectations 
- Lack of recognition/ 
rewards 
 
 
 
Theme 5: RD 
successes and 
achievements 
 
 
5A Defining success 
 
- Processes; 
setting up 
networks and 
partners joining 
- Achievements: 
Pledges and 
impacts; raised 
awareness 
  
 
 
Theme 6: Improving 
the RD in a time of 
uncertainty 
 
 
6A Political uncertainty 
 
 
6B Vision and visibility 
- Raising the 
RD’s profile 
 
6C Strengthening the 
RD 
- ‘growing more 
teeth’ 
- Clarity and 
accountability  
- Monitoring and 
scrutiny 
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Highlights  
 
 
 Business partners participated in the Responsibility Deal for reputational reasons.  
 Partners frequently chose pledges reflecting work they were already doing.  
 The Responsibility Deal is likely to have limited ‘added value’.  
 Government needs to set out a clear vision for the RD.  
 These findings have implications for the development of other voluntary agreements. 
 
 
 
